Theme: This paper looks at the main causes of dissension and the preferences of the EU's Member States that must be solved by the Cypriot Presidency in order to reach an agreement on the MFF 2014-2020 by the end of the year.
level issues -such as agriculture payments and cohesion policy-have barely been discussed.
The euro crisis and the cleavage between Member States on the budgetary stimulus for growth and national cutbacks have affected the ongoing negotiations. The perceived decline in public support for the EU has added further tension, in addition to the fact that the Member States to be most affected by the crisis are those that have for decades been receiving structural support from the EU budget.
Nevertheless, aside from the pessimistic context and the contentious nature of the ongoing debate, there seems to be some common ground between the Member States to work towards a MFF 2014-2020 which contributes to growth and employment in line with the EU 2020 Strategy. If this common understanding materialises this would not only be a major step to convert the budget to an instrument to overcome the crisis but also change the nature of the communitarian budget.
This analysis looks at main issues in contention, in addition to the proposals of the leading players to show the current state of the negotiations and the challenges facing the Cypriot EU Presidency, whose aim is to reach an agreement on the MFF 2014-2020 during the semester. The authors aim to provide an insight into the complex negotiations surrounding the MFF 2014-2020, although it draws short of presenting the entire range of measures linked to the policy proposals for the new MFF.
The State of Negotiations
During the past few months the Polish and Danish EU Presidencies have attempted to bring the Member States' positions closer, but they remain divided on several key elements of the European Commission's proposals. 2 The discussion is still primarily focused on the overall size of the MFF 2014-2020 as well as on the decisive questions of CAP reform and the future Cohesion Policy. Two broad groups of opinions can be identified: the 'Friends of Cohesion Policy' 3 and the 'Friends of Better Spending '. 4 Although both groups agree that the EU should primarily direct its efforts towards measures which contribute significantly to sustainable economic growth and employment, the former focuses on the fact that the EC's budgetary proposal is the bare minimum for the task. The latter group insists on the need of limiting public spending and considers that the quality of expenditure is the key to generating additional growth.
Despite this conflict, the idea that the MFF 2014-2020 should play an important role in stimulating growth appeared to be gaining traction. 5 During the European Council at the end of June, Member States adopted the 'Compact for Growth and Jobs' which will reallocate €60 billion of unused structural funds and €60 billion of capital of the European Investment Bank for fast-acting growth measures. In general terms, the proposed structure and duration of the MFF 2014-2020 are a continuation of the MFF 2007-2013. The EC tried to accommodate the austerity demands of some Member States in order to maintain a certain influence in the negotiation process and to avoid the risk of a stalemate. However, the proposal also included insights from the budget review as well as initiatives from the EP. In this regard, the EC proposed several innovative elements and changes to the 'rules of the game' on budgetary decisionmaking. The main novelties in the proposal can be summarised as follows:
• Concentration on key policy priorities, above all those of the EU2020 Strategy, in order to prioritise spending on growth and employment policies to counter the EU's economic crisis.
• EU spending should clearly offer 'European added value', meaning that there is a general budgetary constraint and choices have to be made.
• Simplification-reduction of instruments and of the administrative burden, especially as regards structural funds and research and innovation funding.
• Introduction of ex ante and ex post conditionality in regional policy, thus linking the use of structural funds to national budgetary management and the fulfilment of the Stability and Growth Pact objectives.
• Flexibility within and across budgetary headings in response to a now traditional demand from the European Parliament.
• An own-resource system based on a Financial Transactions Tax (FTT) and a reformed Value Added Tax (VAT): this is a major innovation in the proposal and tries to give the EU budget a greater autonomy and a new source of income that is not linked to national GDPs.
• Enhanced use of innovative financial instruments (public-private partnership and the European Investment Bank) in areas such as research and innovation and structural funds.
With regard to the overall ceiling, the Commission proposed an amount for the following seven years of €1,025 billion in commitments (1.05% of the EU's GNI) and €972.2 billion (1% of the EU's GNI) in payments. This is a 5% increase in the EU budget with respect to the MFF and is an optimistic proposal compared with the evolution of national budgets, subject to strict compliance with the restrictions of the Stability Pact and the new Treaty on Fiscal Discipline.
Regarding the specific spending headings, although all of them have been subject to dynamic reforms in the past decades, the two largest -the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and Cohesion Policy-are again the most debated topics and continue to concentrate most of the funding. Heading 3 (Security and Citizenship), heading 4 (Foreign affairs) and heading 5 (Administration), with smaller amounts, are less problematic.
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As regards Cohesion Policy, the EC proposed €376 billion, including €40 billion reserved for a future infrastructure fund, earmarking the objectives for the EU2020 Strategy and the creation of a new 'transition region' category. In order to ensure that the reformed CAP contributes to the goals of the EU2020 strategy, the EC proposed a stronger conditionality of direct payments to farmers on environmentally supportive practices, the capping and convergence of direct payments and the inclusion of the second pillar of the CAP -rural development-in a common strategic framework, together with the Structural Funds. The share for the CAP of the total budget will be reduced from 41% to 36%, showing the priority given to the €80 billion for Research and Innovation -Horizon 2020-which will concentrate on areas that can stimulate economic growth and competitiveness, such as health, food security and the bio-economy, energy and climate change. The Commission has also proposed increasing the resources for its external action to €96 billion, following the creation of the External European Action Service, and will focus on four policy priorities: enlargement, neighbourhood, cooperation with strategic partners and development cooperation, including a new Partnership Instrument replacing the Industrial Cooperation Instrument. The main differences with the current framework are primarily policy principles: differentiation, conditionality and concentration as well as the renewed attempt to achieve a greater simplification.
Regarding administrative expenditure, the EC proposes a 5% reduction in the staff of each institution, as well as measures to increase efficiency.
Players' Preferences (2): The European Parliament
The Treaty of Lisbon gave the European Parliament (EP) more power as regards to the MFF (TFEU Art. 312). It is a fundamental change compared to the previous negotiations because Member States have to take into account the decision of the EP before reaching a final agreement. The experience of the first two years of the Treaty has also shown the enhanced political role of the EP in the annual budgetary negotiations.
In the MFF 2014-2020 the EP has been one of the major players from the very beginning of the current negotiation process:
• It did not wait for the Commission's proposal before presenting its own position.
• It prepared position papers on contentious issues in accordance with the Council's negotiation steps.
• Its representatives meet the Trio Presidency ahead of the General Affairs Council.
• It is increasingly the contact point on a day-to-day basis for the national parliaments and at common conferences.
Traditionally, the European Parliament has an incentive to propose expenditure programmes. In practice, however, differences in the incentives for Member States and the EP have been reduced. On the one hand, there is a growing acceptance among MEPs of an austerity approach towards budgetary decisions and, on the other, the interests of individual Member States in specific expenditure headings coincide with those of the EP. In this respect the definition of a common position on specific spending headings, eg, the Cohesion Policy, is increasing in complexity. 8 In the same way, with regard to CAP reform, MEPs have submitted more that 7,000 amendments to the draft proposals for reform, 9 and the Agriculture Committee will have to work hard to find a common position which has to be voted on by the end of November.
Nevertheless, an overwhelming majority of MEPs approved the report of the Special committee on the Policy challenges and budgetary resources for a sustainable Union after 2013 (SURE). It called for an increase of at least 5% over the 2013 budget for the next MFF, which would raise the size of the budget to 1.1% of the EU's GNI. According to the EP this would not imply an additional burden for the Member States. The EP voted on 23 May 2012 on a resolution in favour of a FTT as a measure to generate additional own resources for the EU budget.
The resolution underlined that the EP will not give its consent to the MFF without a political agreement on the reform of the own-resources system. In addition, a further resolution on the MFF 2014-2020 which called for more flexibility for shifting funds between the different areas of expenditures as well as between fiscal years was adopted by an overwhelming majority in June 2012.
Players' Preferences (3): The Presidency
The mediation provided by the EU's Presidency is indispensable for finding compromises and for the final package deal. Adopting a 'European' hat, Presidencies keep the negotiations moving at various institutional levels and present compromise options on contentious issues at critical moments in the negotiation. While the Polish EU Presidency pursued a 'bottom-up' philosophy in order to improve the understanding of the individual negotiating positions, the Danish EU Presidency assumed a more proactive approach and presented during its term different versions of the 'negotiating box'. Experience shows that small Member States make for good EU Presidencies, since they are cautious in their external behaviour, acting as honest brokers. However, so far no small country has been able to reach an agreement on a MFF. It has always been the bigger Member States that can subordinate certain national material interests to the benefit of reaching an agreement.
10 During the negotiation of the MFF 2007-2013, the Luxemburg Presidency failed to achieve an agreement and only the UK Presidency managed to reach it by accepting a reduction in its 'rebate'. Finally, the recently elected Chancellor Merkel helped with some additional resources to reach the package deal.
Whether Cyprus, which is hosting its first Presidency, manages to fulfil these expectations and its own ambitions remains to be seen. Several observers consider that its limited administrative resources, its current minority government and fragile economic situation are not the best conditions for a successful EU Presidency.
11 Nevertheless, Nicosia confirmed its ambition of reaching an informal agreement at the October European Council, a deal with the European Parliament in November and a final agreement in 8 'EU kicks off negotiations over regional funding budget', Euroactive, 13/VII/2012. December. In 2013 Ireland will assume the Presidency, again a small country but experienced in chairing the Council.
Players' Preferences (4): The Member States
Member States receive different amounts of financial resources from specific headings of the EU budget and contribute to its financing. Although these national financial balances or net returns do not reflect the benefits of EU integration, EU member states traditionally concentrate primarily on these zero-sum terms in order to determine their negotiating positions.
The bargaining power of Member States and the unanimity rule, according to which any Member State can block the final agreement, determine the outcome of the intergovernmental negotiations. Within this context the top one or two priorities of each Member State have to be accommodated as far as possible, no matter the size of the country. Nevertheless, in the EU-27 coalition building has become more important. As already mentioned, two broad groups can be identified: the 'Friends of Cohesion Policy' and the 'Friends of Better Spending'. Although the names have changed both groups represent the traditional division between net payers and net recipients. In addition, both groups (with the exception of Italy) also reflect the existing cleavage between Member States on EU anticrisis measures. During the General Affairs Council on 24 April a group of seven Member States signed as the 'Friends of Better Spending' a non-paper reiterating their demands for a limitation of public expenditure at the European level 12 and a concentration of their impact in order to reach sustainable growth and the economic governance objectives. In addition, the spending of EU funds should be planned, programmed, controlled and evaluated in a more efficient way. Similar concerns were raised on the amended MFF 2014-2020; the group claimed that it was still inconsistent with the current economic crisis and Member States' fiscal consolidation efforts. The 'Friends of Better Spending' represent those countries where the debate at the national level is more politicised and where the budget has become an issue of political symbolism. National parliaments such as the Dutch and the British have approved negotiating lines for their governments, dictating a nominal freeze of the budget. In others, such as Germany, debate between citizens and policy makers concerning its role as European paymaster backs the government's austerity position. Besides the conflict line between the 'Friends of Cohesion Policy' and the 'Friends of Better Spending', both groups disagree internally over which headings of the budget should be subject to spending restrictions and which heading should be prioritised, as well as how the EU should be financed.
Overall Ceiling: Because of the general austerity debate there is no Member State advocating an increase in the level of the EU budget as foreseen by the EC. However, among the 'Friends of Better Spending' there emerged a debate on how much the budget should be reduced. While in January 2012 the UK, Germany, Austria, the Netherlands and Sweden demanded that the Commission's proposal needed to be reduced by €100 billion, Finland claimed a budget of less than 1% of the EU-27's GNI.
After supporting the demands for austerity, Italy has recently sympathised with the 'Friends of Cohesion Policy'. France changed its position after the national elections and together with the Czech Republic did not specify what amount of reduction it was seeking. However, there is a growing number of Member states which demand the inclusion of spending topics which have been placed outside the budget in the MFF structure, such as the emergency tools for agricultural market crises, which could require cuts in other areas.
Cohesion Policy: As we have seen, beneficiary countries try to ensure sufficient funding for Cohesion Policy. In this context, several cohesion countries criticise the new macrofiscal conditionality proposed. Although the goal of conditionality, as favoured by the group of better spenders, is to punish misbehaviour at the national level, suspending funding will have the most direct negative impact in the regions. Some countries (Italy, Poland, Lithuania and Estonia, among others) called for macroeconomic conditionality to apply to all EU policies, not just in the field of structural funds, rural development and fisheries funds.
The definition of the new category of 'transition regions' 16 has also been met with scepticism, and several Member States have argued that it would be better to concentrate resources on the regions that are most in need. On the other hand, some French and German regions oppose their governments' positions and, together with Spain, firmly support the new 'transition regions' category.
The 'Friends of Cohesion' proposed not to include specific measures in the future Cohesion Policy for Member States with a significant decrease in their GDP between 2007 and 2009. 17 This was criticised by the Spanish government, which only recently committed to this group along with the Czech Republic in June 2012, after the demand was excluded. In addition, cuts in other headings in favour of Cohesion Policy are not supported by all Member States, and neither is the new limit of 2.5% of GDP imposed on structural funds, as opposed to the previous 4% limit.
Furthermore, several Member States, mainly the 'Friends of Better Spending', would like to cap spending in Cohesion Policy and create a 'reversed safety net' or concentrate structural funds on tackling unemployment, particularly youth unemployment. These proposals could also create tensions in the 'Friends of Cohesion'.
Common Agricultural Policy:
The proposals regarding CAP reform deeply divide Member States. On the one hand, the proposals do not follow the preferences of those Member States (such as the UK, Denmark and Sweden) which are critical of CAP and have proposed to eliminate or substantially reduce direct aid. On the other hand, the proposals have not been welcomed by traditional beneficiaries of CAP like France, Ireland and Spain, which criticise among other things the cuts in overall spending on CAP and that the reform proposals are too far-reaching.
A third group, namely Poland and some other new Member States, demands a much stronger reform of this policy in order to achieve the equalisation of direct payments and fair competition for farmers in the EU market. In 2010 France was the biggest recipient of agricultural funds (18%), with Germany and Spain occupying second place (each receiving 13% of agricultural expenditure). fulfilment of the Millennium Goals. Enlargement and the ENP are further priorities. Nevertheless, Member States which are giving priority to specific headings (like PAC or Cohesion Policy) would probably argue that the cuts be made elsewhere, such as heading 4. Moreover, Member States which advocate a reduction of the EU budget would accept cuts in Heading 4 in order to get a final agreement. In addition, we can expect a strong discussion on the question of which specific regions will receive financial support and on how the new policy principles for the EU external actions will be put into practice. The Spanish government already argued that there should be an increase in funds for Latin America, and expressed concern over the fact that the MFF 2014-2020 will exclude bilateral agreements with 11 countries in Latin America.
Administration: While several Member States -Finland, Ireland, the Netherlands, Spain and Sweden-demanded additional cuts in Heading 5, Belgium, Luxemburg and Poland support the Commission's proposals.
EU Own Resources:
Almost all Member States agree that the own-resources system needs to be reformed; nevertheless, the question of how reform should be carried out is highly controversial. France, Belgium, Greece and Austria are in favour of the introduction of a Financial Transactions Tax and consider allocating a portion of its revenue to the EU budget. France, especially, has taken the lead in demanding new own-resources in order to ensure coherence between the EU budget's ambitions and capacities. Germany is also in favour of the introduction of a FTT but would like to collect it by itself and continue with the GNI-based resource. The UK has already firmly rejected all proposals regarding new own resources.
18
With regard to the system of correction mechanisms, the EC proposes to replace all corrections mechanisms by a system of fixed annual lump sums when the contribution is excessive compared to relative prosperity. This proposal is mainly rejected by the UK, which is the main beneficiary of the current British rebate. Other Member States (Spain and new Member States) consider that corrections are not justified.
